




The Quad process: 
The evolution of diplomatic and 
maritime security cooperation in the 
Indo Pacific1
Dr Thomas S. Wilkins
The Quad is back
The US-Japan-Australia-India Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue 
(QSD), or simply “Quad,” process continues to attract the attention of 
policy-makers, analysts, and scholars interested in the impact of this 
new and potentially significant alignment formation on the security 
dynamics of the Indo Pacific region.  The reemergence of the Quad 
meetings in 2017 after their abrupt termination over a decade ago 
in 2007 has led analysts to wonder if it is now here to stay this time 
as an enduring additional component of the region’s multifarious 
security architecture.  It has also animated a heated debate about its 
true nature and purpose, with commentators bitterly divided in their 
appraisal.  Some believe it lacks real substance and cohesion, whilst 
others argue it has the portentous makings of a new military alliance 
aimed at containing the PRC.  Nevertheless, despite prodigious 
efforts on behalf of the strategic commentariat, the actual substance 
and nature of the Quad itself remains enveloped by mixed signals, 
misapprehensions, and mischaracterizations. As Graeme Dobell 
recounts: ‘The Quad is more notable for the questions it provokes 
than the answers it offers.’2
This Policy Brief aims at clarifying the current state of the Quad 
in the context of the Indo Pacific security environment by doing two 
things.  Firstly, by exploring its multiple categorizations as some 
1　ThisPolicyBrief isgroundedindiscussionheldatthe“Quad-Plus”Dialogue
co-sponsoredby JIIAon20February2019.Theauthoralsowishes to
acknowledgeProf. JustinHastingsof theUniversityof Sydney for the
invitation topresenton this topic at theMaritimeSecurityForum15th
November2019.
2　GraemeDobell, ‘TheQuantityandQualityofQuadQuestions,’TheStrategist,
Australian StrategicPolicy Institute, 25February2019, https://www.
aspistrategist.org.au/the-quantity-and-quality-of-quad-questions.
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form of security provider – is it an alliance, a 
minilateral institution, or security community 
– or some different form of security alignment 
altogether?  Secondly, it proceeds to outline 
the content of the quad alignment – actual and 
potential – to substantiate its two-faceted nature 
as both (i) an important diplomatic vehicle, 
and (ii) as a means to coordinate on maritime 
security issues.  It argues that we need to move 
beyond imprecise or outdated (“alliance-bound”) 
notions of how joint security cooperation is 
manifested in the Indo Pacific age, and that 
through the process of outlining its core 
diplomatic and maritime elements we can gain a 
better appreciation of what it actually is, what it 
actually does, and what it may become.
What is the quad?
The Quad first appeared in the form of 
joint security consultations between the US, 
Japan, Australia and India on the sidelines of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 2007. 
According to an Australian Parliamentarian, 
it was simply viewed at the time as ‘the first 
informal meeting of of f icials from those 
four countries to look at issues of common 
interest.’3  But it lasted less than a year before 
being effectively terminated by an Australian 
government apparently unwilling or unable to 
withstand Chinese diplomatic pressure against 
its continuation (a fact later vehemently denied 
3　ParliamentofAustralia, ‘StandingCommitteeonForeignAffairs,DefenceandTrade,’ForeignAffairsandTrade
Portfolio,28May2007,https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au.










9　JoelWuthnow, ‘ContestedStrategies:China, theUnitedStates,and the Indo-PacificSecurityDilemma,’China
InternationalStrategyReview1:1,2019,pp.99–110;MingfuLiu,TheChinaDream :GreatPowerThinking&
StrategicPostureinthePost-AmericanEra(NewYork,NY:CNTimesBooks,2015).
by the then-Prime Minister Kevin Rudd).4  It 
then entered a ten-year hiatus during which 
evidence of China’s assertive behavior upon 
the regional order star ted to accumulate – 
such as its militarization of the South China 
Sea (SCS), domestic interference operations in 
Australia, and advancing strategic penetration 
of the Indian Ocean, South East Asia and Pacific 
Islands region.  This resulted in a reactivation 
of the Quad in 2017 on the sidelines of the 2017 
East Asia Summit (EAS), sometimes dubbed 
“Quad 2.0” or “Quad Redux”. Consequently, 
the 2019 US Indo Pacific Strategy Report now 
affirms that ‘The Quad is an important forum to 
discuss the respective Indo-Pacific visions of the 
four countries, all grounded in an affirmation 
of ASEAN centrality and building on existing 
trilateral relationships.’5 It has since met five 
times (to December 2019), been upgraded 
to Ministerial level, and has even tentatively 
expanded to include additional partners with 
a strategic interest in the Indo-Pacific concept, 
par ticularly the UK and France, with other 
potential interested parties from ASEAN and the 
Indian Ocean littoral hovering on the sidelines, 
but as yet uncommitted to joining.
Despite is rapid recrudescence it remains 
a much-misunderstood arrangement.  It has 
been variously characterized as an ‘alliance,’6 
‘axis of democracies,’7 ‘security diamond’8 and 







Some of these appellations are subjectively 
tethered to attempts to disparage or lend to 
support, accordingly.  But taking an objective 
look at what the Quad actually constitutes in 
terms of a security alignment should clarify 
matters and assist in overcoming a multitude 
of  accompanying misunderstandings or 
misperceptions.  It should be noted that such 
an exercise must be necessarily qualified by a 
degree of divergence among the Quad partners 
themselves as to how they conceive of the 
arrangement, or on how they wish it to evolve in 
the future, which will be subsequently noted.
Based upon a long lineage of theorizing on 
the nature of practical security cooperation 
in the International Relations (IR) discipline, 
there is a strong claim to view the Quad as 
some form of security alignment.  According 
to Walt and Stephen David, ‘alignment’ is ‘a 
relationship between two or more states that 
involves mutual expectations of some degree 
of policy coordination on security issues 
under certain conditions.’10  Such alignments 
may take on dif ficult guises according to 
their purpose, intensity and degree of formal 
institutionalization.  These include well -
known archetypes of alignment, such as the 
omnipresent ‘alliance,’ ‘coalitions,’ ‘ententes’ 
and ‘security communities,’ to name the most 
prominent examples.11  Matched against 
commonly held criteria the Quad (as yet) 
convincingly conforms to none of these and they 
should therefore be discarded as accurate or 
appropriate descriptors.  
Instead, I argue that the Quad is a new and 
less familiar form of security alignment.  It 
represents a dedicated “Strategic Partnership 







alignment it  is emblematic of a range of 
commonly-shared security interests, reinforced 
through convergent  values-system, and 
grounded in a degree of informal/formal 
diplomatic and practical institutional linkages. 
It must be stated unequivocally at this point, 
that security alignments – such as strategic 
par tnerships – are not to be conflated with 
inclusive security dialogue forums – such as 
the EAS or ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
for example – as these types of multilateral 
institutions are characterized by superintending 
efforts to overcome or resolve contending or 
conflicting security concerns (i.e. divergent 
interests and values), not jointly and exclusively 
advance them in unison.  In contrast then, 
strategic partnership itself embodies an effort at 
structured collaboration between states to take 
joint advantage of economic opportunities, or to 
respond to security challenges more effectively 
than could be achieved in isolation.12 These 
strategic partnerships typically encompass joint 
diplomatic and security cooperation (normally 
including joint leadership summit meetings as 
well as “2+2” Foreign and Defense Minister 
meetings), a degree of defence and mil-mil ties, 
often including joint exercises, and even state-
backed cultural avenues of cooperation.  When 
multiple and interlocking strategic partnerships 
are in effect, they form a mutually-reinforcing 
“network.’ (Note: The Quad is also referred to 
as “minilateral,” but this has no bearing on its 
de facto constitution as a “Strategic Partnership 
network”).
This seems to capture well the versatile, 
informal and ‘networked’ nature of Quadrilateral 
secur i ty  a l ignment ,  where one layer  of 
interaction/formal linkage is layered upon 





to the Quad strategic par tnership network. 
First there are the Quad consultations, which 
were upgraded to the Ministerial level (as per 
strategic partnership model just cited above). 
Consultations on issues of common concern 
also occur in various Track 1.5 dialogues 
(e.g. Raisina Dialogue) and through other 
multilateral forums, allowing for “vir tual” 
coordination related to, but not formalized, as 
Quad cooperation.  Second, in addition to this 
direct quadrilateral consultation, which may 
appear rather insubstantial, however is much 
more concrete evidence of cooperative activities 
that occurs through a “network” or interlocking 
bilateral (and trilateral) arrangements between 
the powers. With respect to the bilateral facet, 
Japan and Australia are direct military allies of 
the United States.  Additionally, they are “special 
strategic partners” themselves, and both have 
Strategic Partnerships with New Delhi, which 
also enjoys an impor tant bilateral Strategic 
Par tnership with Washington; all of which 
conform to the definitional criteria above. This 
amounts to a ‘strategic partnership network.’ 
In the case of trilateral linkages, the US, Japan 
and Australia are further aligned through the 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD).  India also 
engages in trilateral cooperation with the US and 
Japan on one hand, and Australia and Japan on 
the other.  These trilateral facets add yet another 
constituent layer to support and substantiate the 
Quad itself. Thus, as Dhruva Jaishankar points 
out ‘It’s helpful to examine the Quad less as a 
bloc of four countries and more as a matrix of 
trilateral and bilateral relationships. The four 
already enjoy three trilateral and six bilateral 
strategic dialogues, not counting a host of other 
military engagements and working groups.13
One notable characteristic of strategic 






to traditional military alliances – is the “goal-
orientated,” rather than explicitly “threat-
orientated” drivers behind it.  In other words, 
a strategic partnership is typically orientated 
toward accomplishing positive objectives (and 
preventing negative outcomes), than preparing 
to defend or attack and opposing third party, as 
per a traditional military alliance.  According 
to the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for 
example: “the Indo pacific is for something - 
not against somebody.”14 That said, challenges 
to shared interests and values among the 
Quad par tners have natural ly coalesced 
around the PRC as an unspoken “other” due 
to the challenges it presents to these positive 
values, such as the “Rules-based Order” (RBO) 
through its own clearly competing vision of 
regional order, (discussed below).  But this is 
still far from a concrete effort at alliance-type 
military balancing or containment, it should be 
remembered. On this basis, it is worthwhile 
to expand upon two of the central strategic 
elements of the Quad alignment that serve to 
exemplify these claims.  Indeed, As Australian 
Foreign Minister Marise Payne highlighted 
at the September 2019 Quad Ministerial 
meeting, the Quad is seen as mechanism to 
address “maritime security, infrastructure 
and connectivity in suppor t of rules-based 
frameworks.”15
(i) Quadrilateral diplomatic convergence
Like all genuine security alignments (as 
opposed to multilateral dialogue forums), 
the Quad has been actuated by a range over 
overlapping common strategic interests and 
reinforced through shared values, which 
were explicitly emphasized at the latest Quad 
meeting.  This section now explores these 







alignment through the Quad mechanism.
Firstly, the Quad is invariably tethered to the 
newly prominent strategic concept of the “Indo 
Pacific” (IP).  Occasionally the Quad and the 
Indo Pacific have been conflated as one entity, 
with Quad seen as the political manifestation of 
the Indo Pacific geopolitical construct.16 Indeed, 
Huong Le Thu notes that ‘A key to the success of 
the Quad is its relationship with the Indo-Pacific 
concept.’17  In essence the Indo Pacific concept 
embodies a “duality” as both a (neutral) regional 
descriptor and an identifiable strategic arena for 
the dedicated policies of the Quad powers, as 
Rory Medcalf and others have noted.18  Thus, 
the IP is a defining element of the regional 
security policies of the four partners, around 
which they have crafted more of less explicit 
versions of their own “Indo Pacific strategies” 
which reflect their strategic interests and 
national values.19 Again, this was underlined by a 
Senior US State department Official at the most 
recent Quad meeting when he affirmed that ‘We 
have our Indo-Pacific strategy, the other three 
have very similar and overlapping strategies 
that deal with their interests throughout the 
region.’20



















concept, the Quad parties are aligned toward 
protecting the “Rules Based Order” (RBO) 
in the Indo Pacific region. At the 2019 Quad 
meeting in Bangkok ‘The four nations reaffirmed 
their shared commitment to preserving and 
promoting the rules-based order in the region.’21 
This notion has featured prominently in the 
policy documents and statements of the four 
powers as reflection of the aforementioned 
values and interests.  Specifically, many of the 
RBO’s objectives have been operationalized 
through the closely associated “Free and Open 
Indo Pacific” (FOIP) strategy/vision.22  Huong 
Le Thu also notes that ‘Quad 2.0 coincides with 
the promotion of the theme of a “free and open 
Indo-Pacific” (FOIP), also articulated (although 
not without differences) by the four partners.’23 
This initiative was first championed by Japan as 
a follow through on Prime Minster Abe’s earlier 
notions of a “arc of freedom and prosperity,” 
and “democratic security diamond,” and has 
subsequently been adopted as a centerpiece 
of the American Indo Pacific Strategy Report 
(IPSR).24  India has officially endorsed the FOIP 
(with some caveats) and Australia adheres 
to it in all but name, preferring the pedantic 
descriptor “Open, inclusive and prosperous Indo 
Pacific” (OIPIP); a label that has not stuck.25  In 





the following: ‘Promotion and establishment 
of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, free 
trade, etc.; Pursuit of economic prosperity; 
and Commitment for peace and stability.’26 
Underlying these FOIP principles have been a 
range of coordinated or individually intersecting 
initiatives to improve regional connectivity and 
supply much-needed infrastructural funding 
and exper tise across the region, combined 
with mutual assistance in the area of maritime 
security (discussed in the next section).  But 
at this point it must be empathically noted 
that ‘while the FOIP advocates openness and 
inclusivity’ in some respects, ‘the Quad is a 
minilateral [strategic par tnership network], 
which by definition has exclusive membership 
and a limited and sharply focused agenda.’27 
This is what distinguishes the Quad per se as an 
alignment from a broader policy (FOIP) that its 
partners jointly advocate.
Thirdly,  despite scr upulous ef for ts at 
d ip lomat ic  obfuscat ion,  i t  i s  commonly 
understood that the actions of the PRC have 
served to unify the four partners through the 
processes just described.  In the context of ever 
accumulating Chinese power, the four countries 
have looked apprehensively upon the Belt 
and Road Initiative (BRI) as it seeks to spread 
economic, and with it political, influence across 
the entire IP region.  Washington and Tokyo 
are opposed to this on a general level, including 
the militarization of the SCS, whilst Canberra 
and New Delhi are specifically concerned about 
penetration of their own strategic “backyards” 
– the South Pacific in the case of the former, 
and South Asia (e.g. Pakistan) and Indian 
Ocean, in the case of the latter.  As such, the 
IP, Quad and FOIP stake out the contours of 







an “alternative” vision to a Chinese-dominated 
region, in the geopolitical, economic, and 
ideological spheres.  As Medcalf attests ‘The 
Indo-Pacific is being posited as a counter to a 
China-centric view of regional order under the 
Belt and Road Initiative.’28 Needless to say, the 
IP and FOIP as strategic concepts enunciated 
by the Quad powers have drawn suitable ire 
from Beijing, which characterizes all three as 
nascent containment polices put forward by a 
proto-alliance. A representative comment comes 
from Mingfu Liu, a professor at China’s National 
Defense University , as follows: ‘American has 
entered into an alliance with Australia, India, 
and Japan to curb China’ as China is expected 
to overtake America.29 Likewise, after a poor 
reception among South East Asian capitals, the 
Quad quickly modified is rhetoric to recognize 
the contained salience of “ASEAN centrality” 
to the regional architecture, and seeks to 
harmonize its activities with willing partners 
among them. Rather than undermine ASEAN, 
Bhubhindar Singh claims - ‘it strengthens 
cooperation through other multilateral security 
arrangements in the region. All four countries 
are integrated into the ASEAN-led regional 
security architecture through their status as 
dialogue partners of ASEAN.’30
This is not to suggest that adherence 
to the IP concept, the FOIP principles, or 
common aversion to Chinese expansionism 
has eliminated all  diverging interests or 
worldviews between the par tners.  Like all 
alignments, common interests are the fulcrum 
of cooperation, but other individual nationally 
orientated interests will persist, and occasionally 
conflict, with the common cause.  As Nick Bisley 







different security interests at stake in the region. 
While they all have a general interest in curbing 
PRC assertiveness, there is not a single vital 
national interest that all four share.’31 It is well-
known that the Washington Administration has 
a greater appetite for push back against Beijing 
than its partners, for example.  Japan is in in 
closest conformity with this posture, though 
is presently seeking to harmonize its relations 
with the PRC.  As a lesser power, Australia is 
more conflicted due to internal debates upon 
the economic and political costs of resisting 
China explicitly, though as a result of Chinese 
domestic interference operations its stance had 
hardened somewhat.  India on the other hand 
is protective of its “strategic autonomy” and is 
divided between its latent rivalry with China and 
its troublesome Pakistani neighbor.32  For this 
reason, New Delhi has made repeated efforts 
to dilute the common front of the FOIP, and 
even avoid mention of the “Quad” itself on some 
key platforms, such as the 2019 Shangri-La 
security dialogue. Thus, Rory Medcalf reminds 
us that ‘the multiplicity of Indo-Pacific visions 
put forward by dif ferent countries highlights 
their fundamental inability to agree on how 
to respond to Chinese power and U.S.-China 
tensions.’33
 (ii) Practical quadrilateral cooperation 
in the maritime sphere
Andrew Shearer has advocated ‘The Quad 
should be driven by function rather than form: 
the best way to consolidate support in all four 
capitals is to focus on producing results.’34  One 
way that concrete quadrilateral cooperation, 
both directly and indirectly, manifests itself 








the sphere of maritime security cooperation. 
This is particularly apposite as the Indo Pacific 
as a strategically conceived region is maritime 
by nature; defined by trade flows and naval 
operations, and always has been.35 There are a 
range of existing and potential areas in which 
the Quad powers work together on the maritime 
front.
Most closely related to upholding the RBO 
in the maritime sphere is a commitment to 
common “rules of the road” with regard to 
conduct on the high seas.  At the centre of this 
posture is a support for international law and 
norms, principally UN convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). This includes safeguarding 
of the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS) 
from interdiction by either a strategic of non-
state actors (such as pirates or terrorists). 
The Quad parties are committed to freedom 
of navigation and overflight, with the US most 
prolifically conducting dedicated FONOPS 
near Chinese built ar tificial features in the 
SCS, and Japan and Australia engaged in 
less controversial, lower profile operations. 
Other such maritime rules of the road include 
measures to reduce the risk of accidents or 
unplanned naval encounters, with the Code for 
Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) being a 
centerpiece of these efforts.  The prospect of 
a finalized Code of Conduct in the SCS among 
the regional parties is strongly supported by the 
Quad countries, but appears distant at this time, 
and thus remains a cause for concern.
A second and related area of functional 
cooperation among the partners is their shared 
desire to coordinate on issues of Maritime 





identifies that ‘This may be in the form of access 
to military technology designed for this purpose 
(for example, India’s introduction of US P-8 
surveillance and strike aircraft), development 
o f  j o in t ly  used  mi l i t a r y  in f ras t r uc tur e 
(bases, ports, airstrips) and information- and 
intelligence-sharing.’36  This could also extend 
into the information-sharing sphere (where 
the TSD partners have common agreements 
in place), with Tanvi Madan suggesting that 
‘the quadrilateral could be a useful platform 
to share assessments of Chinese capabilities, 
intentions and actions, and ways of dealing with 
them.’37 A harder dimension to this is potential 
collaboration on Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
of which all the partners have much to share in 
terms of best practice, interoperability, and joint 
training.  Andrew Shearer advocates that the 
Quad ‘ultimately cover…high-end missions such 
as theatre anti-submarine warfare — a growing 
priority as Chinese submarines enter the Indian 
Ocean in increasing numbers.’38  However, 
given the sensitivity of the high-end naval assets 
involved, there may be reluctance to deepen this 
aspect too far.  
Given the defining maritime nature of 
the Indo Pacific, closer naval cooperation 
between the Quad countries in a quadrilateral, 
trilateral, or separate bilateral format, is highly 
appropriate.  Indeed, naval cooperation is 
generally regarded as the easiest form of mil-
to-mil cooperation as it usually takes place 
offshore (thus obviating any national territorial 
sensitivities) and can be centered around 
confidence building measures (CBMs) and 
joint training exchanges.  So far attempts to 









MALABAR Exercises, by admitting Australia 
have been stymied by New Delhi, as instigator 
of these maneuvers.  However, India and 
Australia conduct regular exercises such as 
AUSINDEX, whilst other Quad countries also 
hold joint naval exercises including ANNUALEX 
(US-Japan), TALISMAN SABRE (US-Australia), 
and JIMEX (Japan-India). Such exercises are 
required for the partners to achieve their aim of 
improving their coverage of MDA and overall 
interoperability, as well as sharing perspectives 
on “grey area” scenarios, within their broader 
maritime strategies.
Naturally, the kind of minilateral exercises 
just  detai led assist  the Quad par t ies  in 
addressing a range of shared maritime Non-
Traditional Security (NTS) challenges, as well 
as quietly laying the groundwork for a higher 
degree of military interoperability in the event 
of a regional conflict scenario.  Indeed, the 
successful maritime HA/DR cooperation of the 
“core group” in the wake of the 2004 Indian 
Ocean Tsunami could be identified as the 
genesis of the Quad project itself.  Moreover, 
the par tners also have strong incentives to 
coordinate on counter Piracy and Counter-
Terrorism activities ‘outside the realm of grand 
strategy’ according to Sarah Percy.39  Brewster 
argues that Coast Guard cooperation should 
also be part of this larger naval interaction, 
to address NTS issues such as illegal fishing, 
drug/people smuggling, and general maritime 
law enforcement. He notes that ‘As principally 
law-enforcement agencies, coast guards can 
provide many practical benefits in building a 
stable and secure maritime domain, without the 







Such concerns are not confined to the Quad 
membership themselves, but extend across 
the Indo Pacific region, where the par tners 
collectively or individually have sought to assist 
threatened regional states through capacity-
building initiatives.  Of ficial Development 
Assistance (ODA) and other capacity-building 
actions toward littoral states of the Indian 
Ocean, South East Asia and the PICS are aimed 
at assisting them build up their own MDA to 
help them combat the challenges mentioned 
above, in addition to improving their national 
resilience and ability to withstand strategic 
penetration by Chinese pressure or maritime 
incursions.  A prime example of this is the US 
Maritime Security Initiative (MSI):
‘MSI authorizes the provision of training, 
equipment ,  suppl ies ,  and smal l -scale 
construction to the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
and Bangladesh to enhance their ability to 
“sense, share, and contribute” to maritime 
security and MDA; to create a common 
Regional Maritime Picture; and to empower 
them to observe and control more effectively 
their own sovereign maritime spaces, both 
individually and jointly.’41
Just one example of this is Australia supply 
of maritime patrol boats as ODA to the PICS, 
and the establishment of the Australia Pacific 
Security College in Canberra under its Pacific 
“step up” policy. Japan assisted the Philippines 
and Timor-Leste in their HA/DR capacity 
building and provided road construction training 
at Cambodia’s PKO training centre since 
2012.  Japan also aided Vietnam in underwater 








Finally, there is an impor tant economic 
dimension to such broader efforts among the 
Quad partners.  The FOIP in particular has a 
strong economic as well as strategic element 
aimed at addressing the infrastructure building 
and investment needs of third parties.  Members 
of the Quad individually or jointly have provided 
financial or material assistance in developing the 
port infrastructure of the IP region to enhance 
connectivity and to counter prolific Chinese 
efforts to do the same.  For example the Japan 
international Cooperation Agency (JICA) is 
involved in  major port projects in Mozambique 
(Nacala), Kenya (Mombasa), Madagascar 
(Taomasina), Oman (Duqm), India (Mumbai), 
and Myanmar (Yangon), with other possible 
contracts on the horizon in Bangladesh, and 
possibly Sri Lanka (in partnership with India).43 
The Trilateral Investment Fund set up by the 
TSD powers, and Australia’s Infrastructure 
Development Fund for the PICS, including the 
supply of undersea fiber optic cables between 
Australia, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, 
exemplify such efforts at achieving “high quality 
infrastructure” for the region.
Conclusions
The cooperation detailed above in respect to 
diplomatic coordination and maritime security 
issues, demonstrate the purpose and nature of 
the Quad as a security alignment.  According 
to Hall then ‘The Quad is, in other words, an 
extension of evolving practices, not a radical or 
destabilising innovation.’44 The Quad process 
has only recently been revived and so much 
remains uncertain as to its future trajectory, and 
whether for example it will be upgraded to the 
ministerial level or comprise regular heads of 





to Sameer Lalwani and Heather Byrne ‘the 
contours of the Quad are likely to persist even 
if it is never fleshed out’45  Indeed, the four 
countries ‘today, the four enjoy unprecedented 
levels of information and intelligence exchanges, 
personnel interactions, interoperable equipment 
and habits of cooperation’, according to Dhruva 
Jaishankar.46 What we do know is that it does 
not, by any stretch of the definition, conform 
to more precise and concrete definitions 
of a traditional militar y defence “alliance” 
at present.  Notably, it contains no mutual 
security guarantee or joint alliance planning. 
Though it must be understood that public 
commentators rarely adhere to the more fine-
grained descriptors employed by scholars and 
strategic analysts, this mischaracterization is 
to a degree understandable and unavoidable, 
despite its problematic implications.  Instead, 
the  Quad is  bet ter  conceptual ized as  a 
strategic partnership network with the actual 
quadrilateral consultations simply crowning the 
wide and dense web of bilateral and trilateral 
interactions that knit together the four powers. 
As Dhr uva Jaishankar attests ‘Strategic 
par tnerships between all four countries are 
steadily deepening, and this process has only 
accelerated.’47
Fur thermore, it needs to be understood 
that the Quad is fur ther embodied by their 
joint adherence to the IP strategic concept, and 
the FOIP foreign policy strategy/vision that 
accompanies it.  As Ramesh Thakur notes ‘The 
Indo-Pacific frame integrates geography, the 
‘free and open’ principle and democratic values 
into one strategic construct.’48 But these latter 
two should not be conflated with the Quad itself, 
or with one another, but they do exemplify the 







collectively (to differing degrees).  Moreover, 
whilst the IP construct and the FOIP policy 
are at least nominally neutral and inclusive 
concepts respectively, the Quad itself is de facto 
an exclusive alignment arrangement, open to 
new adherents through the Quad-plus process, 
but unlikely to compromise its core principles 
to incorporate external states that challenge or 
oppose them.  In part due to some significant 
divergences on various issues among the Quad 
par tners themselves it is far from a unified 
containment mechanism aimed at China, but 
rather ‘It serves the limited purpose of political 
signaling and improves coordination among a 
set of like-minded and capable maritime powers 
in the Indo-Pacific.’49  Indeed, its future evolution 
and scope as a security alignment will depend 
as much upon how strategic dynamics of the IP 
continue to unfold. 
